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U.S. in Venezuela: Rapid Intervention and Lasting Consequences

Jesús Sánchez Meleán

This article was originally published in LatidoBeat.

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The detention of Nicolás Maduro in the United States has intensified the debate over U.S. intervention in Latin America, focused on immediate benefits and strategic control, especially in the energy sector. The operation seeks to influence U.S. midterm elections and secure Venezuelan resources under the “America First” policy. The article also examines Trump’s interventions in the region, his interest in installing friendly governments, and the impact of his anti-immigrant rhetoric.

What has occurred in recent days between the United States and Venezuela marks a breaking point that has yet to be fully absorbed. The detention of Nicolás Maduro on U.S. soil and his transfer to a prison in New York not only shook Venezuela’s political landscape but also reopened a broader debate about the nature of this new U.S. intervention in Latin America. It is a rapid, targeted, transactional intervention designed to produce immediate gains rather than structural transformations.

In a recent conversation organized by LatidoBeat—a coalition of local Latino print media in the U.S., of which El Comercio de Colorado is a member—alongside journalists and analysts such as Jairo Mejía Ramos, director of EFE’s Washington bureau, and Professor Ernesto Sagás, it became clear that this is not an exact repetition of the past, even though, as the saying goes, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.” It is not Iraq or Afghanistan. Nor is it the prolonged occupation of Haiti or the Dominican Republic in the early 20th century. It is something else.

Remote control, no boots on the ground

This intervention has a central feature: it does not seek a permanent military presence or an explicit project of democratic reconstruction—at least for now. Its logic is immediate. Capture a leader accused of serious crimes, send a message of force, secure a domestic political gain, and protect strategic interests, particularly energy-related ones. As the shared analysis put it, this is a foreign policy that enters and exits quickly, claims victory, and pulls back, leaving behind an open-ended scenario full of uncertainties.

Sagás described it as a doctrine still under construction, which some are already calling “Donroe”—a personalized, contemporary version of the old Monroe Doctrine. Its scope is geographic, the Western Hemisphere, and its time horizon is short. There is no promise of sustained democratization, only transactions. In this framework, Venezuela appears not so much as a country to be rebuilt, but as a strategic asset—especially because of its oil and the symbolic impact of decapitating a long-criticized regime.

An electoral benefit for Trump

Mejía Ramos added another key factor: political timing. This operation takes place with midterm elections on the horizon and with a narrative carefully crafted to connect foreign policy to domestic benefits. Promises of access to Venezuelan oil, lower gas prices, and reinforcement of the “America First” slogan are not aimed at Caracas, but at the U.S. electorate. The intervention is explained as much by what is happening in Venezuela as by what is happening inside the United States.

But the implications go far beyond the initial blow. In the region, the message is clear: Washington reserves the right to act unilaterally, selectively, and swiftly whenever it deems its interests to be at stake. Not necessarily with troops on the ground, but through surgical operations, diplomatic pressure, electoral influence, and economic control. This opens the door to similar scenarios in other countries, as long as there is a clear “gain” for the White House.

Transfer of power with no date on the calendar

In Venezuela, the outlook is even more complex. Although Maduro is detained, power has not automatically changed hands. Key figures within Chavismo continue to control military, political, and economic structures. The transition—or transfer of power—still has no date, as there is no discussion of an elected president taking office or of elections being held. If a transfer of power does occur, it will be negotiated, fragile, and deeply conditioned by external interests.

No migration relief for Venezuelans in the U.S.

There are no guarantees of immediate democracy, stability, or institutional reconciliation. And in the United States, particularly for the Venezuelan community, the consequences may be paradoxical and painful. As discussed in the forum, the decapitation of the regime does not imply migration relief. On the contrary, it may weaken asylum claims, harden deportations, and deepen the legal uncertainty of thousands of people who fled precisely from the regime now deemed “neutralized” in official discourse.

This text does not seek to close the debate, but to open it. The news lies in the facts; the urgency lies in understanding their meaning. The conversation with Mejía Ramos and Sagás—whose full transcript you can read by following the link provided—offers key insights for interpreting this new phase. Because if anything has become clear, it is that this intervention, though brief in its execution, will have lasting consequences for Venezuela, the region, and the United States.